Insecure about Delhi
Be first to comment
The Commonwealth Games will be held in New Delhi from 3-14 October 2010, and there is continuing concern about the safety and security of the event, perhaps more so in the UK than in Australia.
The challenge from a security perspective is how you can achieve safety and security for all games participants in a high threat environment.
By comparison, the Beijing Summer Olympic Games of 2008 were held in much less difficult security circumstances; the main threat being the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), representing disaffected Uighurs in the remote region of Xinjiang.
The Chinese security authorities closely monitored all Uighur activity in the lead up to the Olympics, and Beijing went into lockdown mode against domestic "dissident elements" for the duration of the games.
India generally has a much less repressive approach to security, despite having a much more significant terrorism problem than China.
The Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan acknowledged in August 2008 that there are as many as 800 active terrorist cells in India. In 2008, 1,113 people died in India as a result of terrorism. The most publicised terrorist attack in 2008 was the November 2008 Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) attack in Mumbai that killed 170 people, including two Australians.
DFAT's current Travel Advice for India notes "the high risk of terrorist activity by militant groups".
Delhi is less dangerous than Mumbai, but an attack by five Islamist terrorists on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 killed nine security staff. Three terrorist bombings on 29 October 2005 killed more than 60 people. There were five more bombings in Delhi on 13 September 2008 killing more than 30.
The most concerning aspect of the attack on the Parliament was the likelihood of insider assistance. The terrorists dressed in Indian Army commando fatigues and entered Parliament through a VIP gate in a vehicle displaying Parliament and Home Ministry security stickers.
Once the attack started, security personnel sealed the building. Had they not done so, many of the more than 200 Ministers and Parliamentarians could have died.
In 2009, there was ongoing terrorist activity in Delhi, with the arrest of LeT members in June and August, and of two suspected Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HM) members in August.
The main aim of Islamist terrorists in India is to put pressure on India to hold a plebiscite over the future of Jammu and Kashmir. They believe that Jammu and Kashmir should not be part of India, and that its majority Islamic population should be given the option of becoming part of Pakistan.
"Islamic" Pakistan and "Hindu" India have fought three wars over this issue. Jammu and Kashmir is now divided between them with a Line of Control separating Pakistan-held Azad (Free) Kashmir from the Indian held southern part of the territory.
Maintaining pressure on India may be just as well served by an attack on Delhi between now and the games, causing major teams to withdraw. The UK is currently in wait-and-see mode until September 2010 because of the possibility of pre-games violence.
Another reason for targeting the games would be to kill athletes and officials from those countries that have "affronted Islam" by having troops in Afghanistan. These include England (the UK is sending four separate teams - England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), Canada and Australia. Such reasoning could result in a similar attack to the armed attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan on 3 March 2009 - or it could take the form of bombing attacks like the ones in New Delhi in 2005 or 2008.
Surprisingly, India's Home Secretary Gopal Krishna Pillai has said he is not aware of security threats to the games, and that no special security measures will be undertaken for athletes from specific countries.
India claims to have security under control with plans for four layers of protective security, a centralised command structure, and the deployment of 8,000 additional police.
It is also being well advised by security consultants like Australian Neil Fergus, a former ASIO officer, who worked on security at the Sydney Olympics and has since advised on security at other major sporting events, such as the Beijing Olympics.
Even so, concerns will relate to the extent to which India is prepared to accept and act on external advice. India has long had a poor track record in the areas of security intelligence, command and control, and counterterrorism response.
Official inquiries into botched responses to past attacks do not seem to have resulted in adequate reforms. By contrast, India's (and Pakistan's) Islamist extremists are well trained, well prepared, and retain the initiative.
They could also - based on the 2001 attack - have insider support that would allow them to circumvent some of the security measures.
Despite the contrast between Australian games officials' optimism and British security officials' pessimism, our main concern should be our duty of care to Australia's athletes - and ensuring that they are exposed to minimal risk.
We should not over-rely on Indian protection. The Australian Federal Police is reportedly planning to provide two or more officers to provide security assistance for the 425+ Australian athletes, while Australian officials have reportedly hired security guards, but we should be thinking of providing much more substantial Australian protective support for our team.
The challenge from a security perspective is how you can achieve safety and security for all games participants in a high threat environment.
By comparison, the Beijing Summer Olympic Games of 2008 were held in much less difficult security circumstances; the main threat being the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), representing disaffected Uighurs in the remote region of Xinjiang.
The Chinese security authorities closely monitored all Uighur activity in the lead up to the Olympics, and Beijing went into lockdown mode against domestic "dissident elements" for the duration of the games.
India generally has a much less repressive approach to security, despite having a much more significant terrorism problem than China.
The Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan acknowledged in August 2008 that there are as many as 800 active terrorist cells in India. In 2008, 1,113 people died in India as a result of terrorism. The most publicised terrorist attack in 2008 was the November 2008 Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) attack in Mumbai that killed 170 people, including two Australians.
DFAT's current Travel Advice for India notes "the high risk of terrorist activity by militant groups".
Delhi is less dangerous than Mumbai, but an attack by five Islamist terrorists on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 killed nine security staff. Three terrorist bombings on 29 October 2005 killed more than 60 people. There were five more bombings in Delhi on 13 September 2008 killing more than 30.
The most concerning aspect of the attack on the Parliament was the likelihood of insider assistance. The terrorists dressed in Indian Army commando fatigues and entered Parliament through a VIP gate in a vehicle displaying Parliament and Home Ministry security stickers.
Once the attack started, security personnel sealed the building. Had they not done so, many of the more than 200 Ministers and Parliamentarians could have died.
In 2009, there was ongoing terrorist activity in Delhi, with the arrest of LeT members in June and August, and of two suspected Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HM) members in August.
The main aim of Islamist terrorists in India is to put pressure on India to hold a plebiscite over the future of Jammu and Kashmir. They believe that Jammu and Kashmir should not be part of India, and that its majority Islamic population should be given the option of becoming part of Pakistan.
"Islamic" Pakistan and "Hindu" India have fought three wars over this issue. Jammu and Kashmir is now divided between them with a Line of Control separating Pakistan-held Azad (Free) Kashmir from the Indian held southern part of the territory.
Maintaining pressure on India may be just as well served by an attack on Delhi between now and the games, causing major teams to withdraw. The UK is currently in wait-and-see mode until September 2010 because of the possibility of pre-games violence.
Another reason for targeting the games would be to kill athletes and officials from those countries that have "affronted Islam" by having troops in Afghanistan. These include England (the UK is sending four separate teams - England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland), Canada and Australia. Such reasoning could result in a similar attack to the armed attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan on 3 March 2009 - or it could take the form of bombing attacks like the ones in New Delhi in 2005 or 2008.
Surprisingly, India's Home Secretary Gopal Krishna Pillai has said he is not aware of security threats to the games, and that no special security measures will be undertaken for athletes from specific countries.
India claims to have security under control with plans for four layers of protective security, a centralised command structure, and the deployment of 8,000 additional police.
It is also being well advised by security consultants like Australian Neil Fergus, a former ASIO officer, who worked on security at the Sydney Olympics and has since advised on security at other major sporting events, such as the Beijing Olympics.
Even so, concerns will relate to the extent to which India is prepared to accept and act on external advice. India has long had a poor track record in the areas of security intelligence, command and control, and counterterrorism response.
Official inquiries into botched responses to past attacks do not seem to have resulted in adequate reforms. By contrast, India's (and Pakistan's) Islamist extremists are well trained, well prepared, and retain the initiative.
They could also - based on the 2001 attack - have insider support that would allow them to circumvent some of the security measures.
Despite the contrast between Australian games officials' optimism and British security officials' pessimism, our main concern should be our duty of care to Australia's athletes - and ensuring that they are exposed to minimal risk.
We should not over-rely on Indian protection. The Australian Federal Police is reportedly planning to provide two or more officers to provide security assistance for the 425+ Australian athletes, while Australian officials have reportedly hired security guards, but we should be thinking of providing much more substantial Australian protective support for our team.
as posted here
